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On Sen on comparative justice
Chandran Kukathas*
Department of Government, London School of Economics, UK
Against scepticism from thinkers including John Rawls and Thomas
Nagel about the appropriateness of justice as the concept through
which global ethical concerns should be approached, Amartya Sen
argues that the problem lies not with the idea of justice, but with a par-
ticular approach to thinking of justice, namely a transcendental
approach. In its stead Sen is determined to offer an alternative system-
atic theory of justice, namely a comparative approach, as a more
promising foundation for a theory of ‘global justice.’ But in the end
Sen offers no such thing. He does not develop a theory of justice and
this is all to the good; for if values are plural in the way Sen suggests,
then justice is not a master idea but one value among many, and it
should be neither the ﬁrst virtue of social institutions, nor the notion
that frames all our reﬂections on ethical and political life.
Keywords: global justice; comparative justice; transcendental; distribu-
tion; universalism
Amartya Sen’s The Idea of Justice (2009) has appeared in a period in the
history of political theory when the idea of justice dominates theoretical
reﬂection about social arrangements. John Rawls famously suggested that
justice was the ﬁrst virtue of social institutions, and those that were not just
ought to be reformed, even if they possessed other merits (Rawls 1971,
p. 3). Rawls’s friends and critics alike have, for the most part, accepted this
claim and the literature of contemporary political theory is substantially a
literature about justice. And as political reﬂection has shufﬂed off its preoc-
cupation with domestic issues and begun to examine international society
and global institutions, so has global justice begun to assume central
importance as a subject for investigation. At this point, however, sceptical
voices have begun to make themselves heard and doubts have been
expressed about the appropriateness of ‘justice’ as the concept through
which global ethical concerns should be approached. Rawls himself
expressed serious reservations about whether his own theory was suitable
for extension across nations, and offered a view of international law that
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drew less on his view of the demands of justice than on his account of
toleration (Rawls 2001).1 More recently, Thomas Nagel has raised his own
objections to the extension of the idea of justice to the evaluation of global
institutions (Nagel 2005). Sen’s intervention in this literature has been to
say that while it is true that theories of justice cannot readily be deployed
to scrutinize global institutions and social and political arrangements in dif-
ferent nations, the problem lies not with the very idea of justice but with a
particular approach to thinking of justice. His aim is to supply an alterna-
tive and, so, to set inquiry into justice in a different, more promising, direc-
tion. The question is whether or not he succeeds.
Sen’s ambition
At the core of Sen’s new theory is the view that transcendental theories of
justice should be forsaken in favour of comparative ones. Transcendental
theories, such as those advanced (according to Sen) by Hobbes, Locke,
Rousseau, Kant and Rawls, take as their starting point the need to imagine
or conceive ideally just social arrangements. There are two problems with
this approach. First, it is not feasible to establish any conclusions about ideal
social arrangements that might meet with universal, or even widespread,
agreement among impartial and open-minded persons. Second, practical rea-
son requires not the establishment of abstract ideal standards but a frame-
work for comparison among feasible alternatives, so transcendental theories
are redundant.2 While Sen’s purpose is plain enough, it needs to be estab-
lished what precisely he has put in place of transcendental theories. Since he
has said that his preferred alternative is a comparative theory, the question is
what this amounts to. More particularly, what is Sen’s comparative theory?
Sen’s theory is not a theory of the just society, for he thinks it is inter-
esting but not useful to ask what is a just society. A systematic theory of
comparative justice does not yield an answer to this question (Sen 2009,
p. 105). Yet Sen is interested in ‘advancing justice in society’ (p. 77) So
what is it that his theory of comparative justice has to offer in the pursuit
of this end, and how does it do so?
One of Sen’s starting points is a conviction that what matters is how
people’s lives go. His dissatisfaction with transcendental theories stems in
part from his unhappiness with their preoccupation with institutions, which
may lead to a failure to consider how real people are affected. When peo-
ples’ lives go badly, he implies, injustice may be afoot. Justice means, to a
substantial degree, mitigating injustice. If injustice is to be addressed, how-
ever, we need to establish not only what is required, but also who has to
take responsibility for causing, as well as for repairing, the injustice. Sen’s
thought here is that such questions have to be settled not by appeal to a
transcendental standard, but also by the use of processes that address them
when and where particular issues of injustice arise. They must be settled in
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the forum of public reason, with an emphasis of the use of democratic
mechanisms, and a commitment to the search for impartial judgment rather
than partisan or parochial resolution. This means that in Sen’s theory jus-
tice is the product of democratic processes in which public reasoning is
conducted according to norms of open impartiality. The idea of open
impartiality is of critical importance, for it means that reasoning will draw
not only upon the judgments and values of local participants, but also upon
the attitudes and perspectives found elsewhere in the world. Justice will
never be a matter of what ‘we’ think around here, but of what critical
reﬂection, drawing on judgments that could come from anywhere, might
reveal through democratic engagement.
Sen is trying to steer a very particular course. He does not want to pro-
vide another ideal theory of justice, and rejects the approach of thinkers
like G. A. Cohen, for whom establishing a transcendental conception of
justice is vitally important. He also rejects constructivist thinkers like
Rawls, who is also too absorbed by the transcendental aspiration. Yet he
also rejects those theorists who might be satisﬁed with appeals to tradition
and to local tradition in particular. Somewhere between abstract universal-
ism and concrete localism lies the Sen theory of comparative justice. Its
aspiration is to bring abstraction back down to earth, but to make particular
individuals and societies look beyond their own narrow conﬁnes to try to
enlarge their own perspectives so that they might see when their current
practices might be unjust, and to recognize when the lives of distant others
might be as much a part of their own sphere of responsibility as the lives
of their more immediate neighbours.
The idea of a theory of comparative justice
While Sen has aspired to give us a theory of comparative justice, it has to
be asked whether he has succeeded. It is not yet clear that he has given us
a theory that is superior to the transcendental theories he criticizes, or
indeed that he has given us a theory at all. He has presented us with a
book full of interesting puzzles, arguments, and insights; but it is not clear
that he has supplied a theory. To be sure, he does say in the Preface that
‘What is presented here is a theory of justice in a very broad sense’ (Sen
2009, p. ix, added emphasis). And he makes abundantly clear that he is not
offering a theory of justice in the sense of a doctrine or philosophy that
resolves questions about the nature of perfect justice (p. ix). Yet if so, in
what sense is what is on offer a theory, unless by theory one means little
more than a collection of ideas related by having a common theme?3 The
possibility I wish to consider is that Sen does not have a theory of compar-
ative justice for no such thing is possible. He has offered an important cri-
tique of transcendental institutionalism as an approach to justice; and he
uncovered some signiﬁcant weaknesses in the parochial attitude to morality
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more generally and to justice in particular. But there is no middle way
between these extremes. Or at least, to the extent that there is, that middle
ground cannot be occupied by a theory of justice.
To see why a theory of comparative justice may not be possible it
would be best to start by looking more closely at what Sen says he is aim-
ing to do in attempting to develop an alternative to the transcendental
approach. Sen is looking to craft a theory of justice that ‘concentrates on
the practical reason behind what is to be chosen and which decisions
should be taken, rather than speculating on what a perfectly just society
[…] would look like’ (Sen 2009, p. 106). While transcendental theories are
not without interest, what we need instead, he thinks ‘is an agreement,
based on public reasonings, on rankings of alternatives that can be realized’
(p. 17). He thinks that ‘A theory of justice must have something to say
about the choices that are actually on offer’ (p. 106). It must take into
account the plurality of reasons and possible conﬂicts of non-eliminable
principles (p. 106). It must leave room for the possibility of reassessment
(p. 107). A theory of justice must make room for an incomplete ranking of
alternatives, because of operational difﬁculties deriving from the limits of
knowledge or simply because some alternatives simply cannot be ranked
(pp. 107–108). It must recognize the possibility of diversity in interpreta-
tion or approach when decisions have to be taken (p. 108).
A theory of comparative justice, unlike transcendental theories, would
focus less on an imagined perfectly just world and more on the sorts of
concern that engage people in discussions on justice and injustice in the
world as we know it. The concern with injustice is particularly important
for Sen. Examples of injustice he identiﬁes include ‘iniquities of hunger’,
poverty, illiteracy, torture, racism, female subjugation, arbitrary incarcera-
tion, and medical exclusion. These are all social conditions that need reme-
dying (p. 96).
It is especially important to emphasize that, given the great diversity of
conditions, the range of issues, and the variety of reasons people ﬁnd com-
pelling, the pursuit of comparative justice cannot be the search for a ﬁnal or
complete ordering of alternatives. This is not to say that differences in judg-
ment must always lead to an impasse; but it is important to recognize none-
theless that ‘a complete theory of justice may well yield an incomplete
ordering of alternative courses of decision, and that an agreed partial rank-
ing will speak unambiguously in some cases and hold its silence in others’
(p. 398). Thus when Smith and Condorcet argued that a world without slav-
ery was more just than a world with slavery, they were not claiming that all
possible states of the world could be rank-ordered; only that a world in
which slavery had been abolished was superior to one in which it had not.
It is also important to see that conclusions about justice must be the
outcome of public reasoning about the ranking of the alternatives under
consideration. The most critical point here, for Sen, is that public reasoning
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about justice not be conﬁned within the scope of the state, region or local
community. If we are parochial we deprive ourselves of sources of criticism
and insight that might bring us to better conclusions than we would reach
if our values and presuppositions were under-scrutinized (p. 402). Justice
requires impartiality, but an open rather than a closed impartiality, for the
bounds of reason should not be limited by geographical boundaries.
These, then, are the most important desiderata of a theory of compara-
tive justice. Does Sen have a theory of justice that would satisfy these
demands? Does he have a theory of justice at all?
Is a theory of comparative justice possible?
Although he seems determined to offer a systematic theory of comparative
justice, Sen really offers no such thing. Indeed he does not develop a the-
ory of justice at all. As we shall see, this is all to the good. To understand
why he has no theory, however, we need to begin by considering what a
theory of justice could be.
Such is the force of the word ‘justice’ that it is widely used to describe
a great range of actions, arrangements or circumstances. Where there is
poverty, or racial discrimination, or female subjugation, we say that justice
is absent or wanting. We commonly describe torture, wrongful imprison-
ment, and the taking of property without consent or compensation (whether
by private persons or the state) as unjust. And justice is not done when
even relatively minor wrongs are committed: when a customer is denied a
refund for a defective purchase, or a lesser beneﬁt is offered to someone
too timid to stand up for his rights. Injustices can be committed by presi-
dents, judges, and hairdressers alike. Justice and injustice are words readily
invoked whenever something is deemed to have gone seriously wrong.
Could the movie Brokeback Mountain failing to win ‘Best Picture’ be any-
thing less than an injustice?
But a theory of justice will not typically attempt to present an account
of the term that systematizes all of its possible, or even most common,
uses. Within political philosophy, the variety of contexts within which jus-
tice is invoked has meant that theories of justice have been theories of par-
ticular kinds of justice: theories of distributive justice, or retributive justice,
or restorative justice, or justice in war, for example. The theories of justice
Sen’s book has criticized and, by implication, looked to supplant, are theo-
ries of distributive justice. They are, like Rawls’s theory, for example, nor-
mative theories – theories intended to be action guiding. They are intended
not merely to elucidate the meaning of the concept of justice but to elabo-
rate particular conceptions of justice. Rawls famously elaborated a theory
he dubbed ‘justice as fairness’, according to which justice was served to
the extent that society conformed to or honoured two basic principles of
fairness. Other theorists who have tackled the problem of coming up with a
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conception of justice have, to the extent that they have disagreed with
Rawls, come up with different principles. The landscape of contemporary
political theory is littered with banners advertising a variety of conceptions,
including libertarian (left- and right-), prioritarian, sufﬁcientarian, utilitarian,
and egalitarian theories of all sorts.
Normative theories of justice purport to be action guiding by supplying
principles by which we might judge whether a particular action is just or
whether a set of outcomes is just or whether an institutional structure is
just. They might do so by elaborating a particular ideal against which to
judge outcomes or institutions, though this is not necessary. An egalitarian
may be happy enough to judge the justice of an outcome by asking
whether or not it is more or less equal than the alternative possibilities.
A libertarian might similarly be happy to judge an action just if no rights-
violation takes place, and an outcome as just because it is the result of
actions that involved no rights-violations – without having recourse to
appeal to any ideal construction of a just society. But normative theories of
distributive justice do advance and defend principles of distribution.4 Sen,
however, does no such thing. This is not because he is indifferent to distri-
butional questions. His extensive work in defence of human ‘capabilities’
as the preferred metric for the measurement and assessment of equality and
inequality suggests quite the reverse. But he does not offer a set of princi-
ples of justice by which to assess actions or outcomes or institutions. He
has suggested that actions and outcomes, and perhaps even institutional
arrangements, can be examined – questioned, challenged, criticized – to see
whether they are just, and argued that one way of assessing them is to con-
sider them in relation to other alternative courses of actions or possible out-
comes, or structural arrangements. But there is no master principle or
combination of principles that he invokes or appeals to in order to make
judgments of justice.
Now Sen himself has suggested, to the contrary, that he does have a
systematic theory of justice. Out of the various comparative judgments, he
indicates, a theory can be identiﬁed and expounded. He only insists that
out of comparison will not arise any kind of transcendence. ‘Could it be
the case that the comparative rankings of the different alternatives must
inter alia also be able to identify the transcendentally just social arrange-
ment? Would the transcendental invariably follow from the full use of the
comparative?’ (Sen 2009, p. 102). His answer to these questions is simply,
no. A sequence of pairwise comparisons will not lead us invariably to any
conclusions about the very best. What Sen does not explain, however, is
how a sequence of pairwise comparisons (or any combination of compara-
tive judgments, for that matter) gives us a ‘systematic theory of compara-
tive justice’.
Indeed if we take seriously the considerations Sen sets out as vitally
important for anyone seeking to develop a comparative theory to appreci-
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ate, it becomes doubtful that a theory of comparative justice is at all possi-
ble. Recall that Sen emphasizes the importance of taking into account
the plurality of reasons people invoke, and the existence of conﬂicts of
non-eliminable principles; the importance of leaving room for the possibil-
ity of reassessment of judgments and allowing for incomplete ranking of
alternatives; and the possibility of diversity in interpretation or approach
when decisions have to be taken. In what sense can a sequence of pairwise
comparisons of alternatives yield a systematic theory of comparative justice
when these cautionary reminders suggest the outcome of a series of
thoughtful deliberations and reﬂections among diverse people is more likely
to lead to highly indeterminate conclusions rather than anything so system-
atic as a body of principles – or even a set of rules of thumb?
One possible objection to this analysis is that the difﬁculties with Sen’s
position do not tell against the possibility of a theory of comparative justice,
only against the success of Sen’s particular attempt to supply one. Whatever
its deﬁciencies, utilitarianism seems to be precisely such a theory, since it
offers a theory of justice according to which we compare societies and rank
them in accordance with their propensity to maximize utility – the most just
society being the one in which aggregate or average utility is highest.5 But
the problem is not merely that Sen has failed to provide a theory. The prob-
lem is that he has in effect shown why such a theory is not possible. The
point, according to Sen, is not simply to come up with a theory that puts
forward some metric according to which all societies might be measured
and then compared. That would be easy enough to do: all one needs is to
determine the relevant measure – utility, liberty, capability, income – and
then try to assess which society best meets the proposed standard. Yet this
will not give us a comparative theory in the sense that Sen means. Theories
that ask us to assess (and compare) societies according to a single formula,
even though they almost surely will yield rankings of societies, are not com-
parative theories in the relevant way. In Sen’s view, the fact that reasons are
plural, and principles conﬂict, means that it will not do simply to invoke
some abstract standard, like utility or liberty, and then propose to compare
arrangements according to these ideals. Comparative assessments must take
place within contexts within which they can intelligibly be made. Thus we
can compare a society or a world with slavery with one without, and say
perfectly intelligently that a world that has been rid of slavery is an
improvement. Similarly, a world without hunger is better than a world in
which many people starve. But whether a world without slavery is better
than a world without hunger is a different question altogether; and no com-
parison can readily be made here – if indeed any comparison can be made
at all. Of course a utilitarian could come along and offer to make the com-
parison by invoking utility as the measure of all things. Or a Philippe van
Parjis might equally suggest that we judge by the standard of freedom that
ought to be maximized. But it is this ‘transcendental’ move that is precisely
202 C. Kukathas
what Sen objects to. His search is for a comparative theory which is the
product of a careful assessment of the range of internally coherent compari-
sons, and which also satisﬁes the other desiderata upon which he insists.
That is the aspiration. The problem is that this will not yield a theory of jus-
tice in anything but the broadest sense of the word theory.
The Idea of Justice
The question is, what then are we to make of Sen’s contribution in The
Idea of Justice? Leaving aside the many individual arguments and insights
scattered across the work, there are two elements that stand out for their
especial signiﬁcance, though Sen himself may, in the end, be reluctant to
endorse the reading of his work to which my analysis leads.
The ﬁrst element is the critique of transcendental theories of justice.
Sen is, to my mind at least, convincing in his argument that transcendental-
ism is neither necessary nor sufﬁcient if we seek to establish a normative
standard by which to make judgments of justice
The second element is the more positive aspect of his work. The Idea
of Justice identiﬁes a number of things that are important for us to consider
when reﬂecting on the questions of justice, and morality more generally.
The conclusions we reach should be the outcome of a process of public
reasoning; that process of reasoning should in turn recognize the plurality
of values and the possibility of an ineradicable conﬂict of principles; that
principles themselves cannot generate ﬁnal answers for everything is sub-
ject to revision; that judgments cannot always readily be aggregated or
ranked; that outcomes of any decision procedure may be indeterminate; and
that there is good reason to strive in our efforts to do what is just to cast
our net wide and consider the views and experiences of those who reside
beyond the conﬁnes of our own locality or our own traditions.
If we take these recommendations seriously, however, we might do bet-
ter to conclude that the way to defend the kind of humane and pluralistic
social order Sen has in mind is not by trying to develop a better account of
justice. If values are plural in the way Sen suggests, justice is not a master
idea that subsumes all else but one value among many. Justice should cer-
tainly be pursued; and in many cases, vigorously. But it is not the ﬁrst vir-
tue of social institutions. Nor is it the notion that should frame all our
reﬂections on ethical and political life.
Notes
1. See also the discussion of the toleration of the intolerant in Sen (2009, sections
34–35).
2. For a summary of Sen’s view, see Sen (2009, pp. 8–10).
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3. Sen (2009, p. 105) writes: ‘A systematic theory of comparative justice does not
need, nor does it necessarily yield, an answer to the question “what is a just
society”.’ I take this to suggest that he is in search of a systematic theory.
4. Aside from Rawls, some prominent examples include Steiner (1994), Dworkin
(2010) and Barry (2005).
5. This was put to me by Laura Valentini.
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